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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the most important and delicate judicial tasks in 
patent law is to keep the obviousness doctrine in 
reasonable working order. There are several reasons why 
the obviousness doctrine has been the subject of frequent 
judicial tinkering. First, patentability doctrines interact 
with each other, so doctrinal alterations that seem to be 
entirely external to the obviousness doctrine frequently 
have ripple effects on obviousness. The interaction between 
the utility and obviousness doctrines provides one good 
example. Second, the obviousness doctrine is internally 
complex. Cases in the chemical and biotechnology areas 
over the past several decades have amply illustrated this 
point. This Article examines Chief Judge Rader’s 
contributions to the task of tuning the obviousness doctrine, 
with particular attention to cases that have arisen after the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements on obviousness in KSR 
v. Teleflex.  
  
                                                                                                         
* Robert A. Lucas Chair in Law and Director, Center for Intellectual 
Property Research, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The obviousness doctrine is rightly considered one of the most 
crucial legal innovations in patent jurisprudence.1
This Article, which focuses on Chief Judge Rader’s 
contributions to the obviousness jurisprudence, shows that judicial 
attention is critical, whether the task is to reconfigure the 
doctrine’s very foundations or simply to conduct routine 
maintenance. Part I addresses obviousness in the context of other 
patentability doctrines (in particular, the utility and disclosure 
doctrines), and observes that changes to these doctrines frequently 
have ripple effects for the law of obviousness, drawing on 
examples both pre- and post-KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc.
 It also may be as 
difficult a concept to implement as any in patent law, or in law 
generally. Given its strong sensitivity to context and its holistic 
orientation, it seems apparent that obviousness will never be 
captured in a comprehensive legislative code. Obviousness, then, 
presents judges with an unenviable and ongoing maintenance task. 
2
                                                                                                         
1 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study in Legal Innovation, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 Parts II and III take up selected aspects of the obviousness 
doctrine itself, examining the ongoing task of judicial fine-tuning  
 
2 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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after KSR and presenting it as one of patent law’s most important 
judicial labors. 
 
I. BALANCING OBVIOUSNESS AGAINST UTILITY AND DISCLOSURE 
DOCTRINES 
 
The obviousness doctrine is too often viewed in isolation. To 
be sure, the obviousness jurisprudence is vast, and the obviousness 
inquiry in any given case may require immersion in a wealth of 
technical facts. However, obviousness is merely one component of 
a constellation of patentability requirements that interact with one 
another. In particular, tuning of the obviousness doctrine is quite 
likely to have collateral consequences for the utility and 
description doctrines—and vice versa. Two important 
biotechnology patent cases—In re Fisher3 and In re Kubin4
 
—
illustrate the point especially well. 
A.  Obviousness v. Section 101 Utility: The Fisher Dissent 
 
Fisher, the expressed sequence tags (“ESTs”) case, is 
principally about the requirement that the invention claimed in a 
patent evince “substantial” and “specific” utility.5 For the first 
time, the Federal Circuit squarely and explicitly embraced the 
Brenner v. Manson6 utility standard, positioning the utility 
requirement as a non-trivial obstacle to patentability, at least in 
some areas of chemical and biotechnological research.7
                                                                                                         
3 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 The Fisher 
court also applied a gloss to the Brenner standard, attempting, with  
 
 
4 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
5 From a policy perspective, Fisher may be viewed as the culmination of a 
long-running debate over whether the award of patent rights on ESTs and other 
research tools would give rise to a potentially catastrophic “anticommons.” 
However, Judge Michel’s opinion for the panel majority declined to engage 
directly in an analysis of “public policy considerations which are more 
appropriately directed to Congress.” Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378.  
6 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
7 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370-71. 
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rather limited success, to define the concepts of substantiality and 
specificity.8
That the Federal Circuit would endorse a robust utility 
requirement in Fisher was by no means a foregone conclusion. The 
Federal Circuit’s pre-Fisher utility jurisprudence, exemplified by 
the court’s opinion in In re Brana,
 
9 seemed to have established a 
relatively permissive approach to utility. At the time, it appeared 
that an applicant’s credible assertions of utility would establish 
prima facie utility in most cases, shifting to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) the responsibility for mustering rebuttal 
evidence, a task that the PTO was generally not well-suited to 
undertake. But the practice of patenting ESTs had drawn 
significant scholarly criticism, and the PTO’s 2001 utility 
guidelines had sent a strong signal that EST claims would be 
closely scrutinized for compliance with the utility requirement.10
Nor did Judge Michel’s opinion in Fisher garner unanimous 
support. Judge Rader dissented.
 
11
The Office needs some tool to reject inventions that 
may advance the “useful arts” but not sufficiently to 
warrant the valuable exclusive right of a patent. The 
Patent Office has seized upon this utility 
requirement to reject these research tools as 
contributing “insubstantially” to the advance of the 
useful arts. The utility requirement is ill suited to 
that task, however, because it lacks any standard for 
assessing the state of the prior art and the 
contributions of the claimed advance. The proper 
tool for assessing sufficient contribution to the 
 Much of the dissenting opinion 
questions the wisdom of using the utility doctrine to filter research 
tools out of the patent system. In a key passage that has received 
less attention than it warrants, Judge Rader acknowledged that the 
PTO’s impulse might be sound, but it had chosen the wrong 
doctrine to effectuate that impulse:  
                                                                                                         
8 Id. at 1371. 
9 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
10 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-02 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
11 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1379 (Rader, J, dissenting). 
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useful arts is the obviousness requirement . . . .12
Why had the PTO not gravitated to the obviousness 
requirement already? Judge Rader blamed the Federal Circuit.
 
13 
The Federal Circuit’s approach to obviousness for DNA inventions 
in In re Deuel,14 observed Judge Rader, had created a dilemma for 
the PTO, reducing the threshold for obviousness to such a degree 
that it deprived the PTO of the opportunity to use obviousness in 
its ordinary role as the principal fine-tuning mechanism among 
patentability doctrines.15
rather than distort the utility test, the Patent Office 
should seek ways to apply the correct test, the test 
used world wide for such assessments (other than in 
the United States), namely inventive step or 
obviousness.
 It was understandable that the PTO had 
elaborated a more robust form of the utility doctrine as a 
counterbalance to a toothless obviousness requirement—but, as 
Judge Rader recognized, this was an inferior solution. The 
problem, as Judge Rader saw it, was potential obviousness, and the 
obviousness doctrine should supply the solution. That is,  
16
This insight—that the obviousness and utility doctrines 
interact—is an important one, having deep historical roots. The 
earliest U.S. patent statutes did not include an obviousness 
requirement, nor was any such requirement firmly established in 
the then-existing case law. But the statute did permit patent rights 
to be defeated if the invention was not “sufficiently useful and 
important.”
 
17
                                                                                                         
12 Id. at 1381-82.  
 Judges never embraced this criterion as the ultimate 
test of patentability, and it eventually fell into disuse while the 
obviousness doctrine flourished. Perhaps judges instinctively 
understood that an unhinged inquiry into “importance” would be 
13 Id. at 1382. 
14 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that prior art disclosure of the 
protein plus general knowledge of cloning did not suffice to render obvious a 
claim to the gene coding for that protein). 
15 Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1382 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
16 Id.  
17 1790 Patent Act § 1; 1836 Patent Act § 7. 
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too subjective as a patentability tool, while an obviousness 
inquiry—requiring a comparison with discrete, identified prior art 
evidence—might be more disciplined.18 Judge Rader’s Fisher 
dissent is a powerful reminder of our longstanding commitment to 
obviousness as the ultimate condition of patentability.19
 
 
B.  Obviousness and the § 112 Written Description 
 
The obviousness doctrine interacts with other patentability 
conditions beyond utility. A primary example is the written 
description requirement.20 In Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly & Co.21 and its progeny, the Federal Circuit 
had invoked the written description requirement aggressively 
against inventors who claimed chemical entities in terms of 
function or result without apparent knowledge of the structure that 
would bring about that function or result.22
In a major decision, In re Kubin,
 Some observers viewed 
the relatively rigorous written description standard as a 
counterbalance to the relatively generous obviousness standard as 
expressed in Deuel. 
23 Judge Rader dealt with the 
obviousness standard directly, as he had been unable to do in 
Fisher. Kubin involved “a classic biotechnology invention—the 
isolation and sequencing of a human gene that encodes a particular 
domain of a protein.”24
                                                                                                         
18 See Mark D. Janis, Daniel Webster’s Patent Cases (manuscript in 
progress). 
 The rejected claims were drawn to isolated 
polynucleotides having a specified sequence and binding to a 
specified protein. The specification disclosed sequences for two 
19 Of interest, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom acknowledged the 
Fisher approach to the utility requirement, but declined to incorporate that 
approach into U.K. jurisprudence on the industrial applicability requirement. 
Human Genome Sci. Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] UKSC 51, [38-41] 
(concluding that gene sequence claims were supported by a sufficient showing 
of industrial applicability). 
20 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
21 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
22 Id. at 1567. 
23 In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
24 Id. at 1352. 
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polynucleotides falling within the scope of the claims. The PTO 
had rejected the claims as lacking adequate written description 
support, on the ground that possession of the two disclosed 
sequences did not establish possession of the claimed genus.25 The 
PTO had also rejected the claimed subject matter for 
obviousness.26
Although both rejections were at issue on appeal, Judge Rader 
neatly evaded the written description issue by analyzing and 
upholding the obviousness rejection, dispensing with Deuel in the 
process.
 
27 The prior art references at issue taught the protein of 
interest, and techniques for isolating and sequencing the gene 
coding for that protein were well-established. Moreover, the 
protein was thought to have a role in immune response, so a person 
of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to derive the 
sequence. This made out a case of obviousness, Judge Rader 
asserted.28
Judge Rader’s conclusion directly contravened Deuel, in which 
the Federal Circuit had said that “the existence of a general method 
of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is essentially irrelevant to 
the question whether the specific molecules themselves would 
have been obvious,” in the absence of prior art suggesting the 
DNAs.
 
29 Discarding Deuel, of course, ordinarily would have 
required a vote of the Federal Circuit en banc. However, Judge 
Rader argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR30 had 
“unambiguously discredited” Deuel,31 for reasons discussed in 
more detail below.32
Kubin is rightly recognized as a leading obviousness case, but, 
by negative implication, it is a leading written description case. It 
  
                                                                                                         
25 Id. at 1353. 
26 Id. at 1354. 
27 Id. at 1353. 
28 Id. at 1354. 
29 Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1559. 
30 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
31 More precisely, Judge Rader asserted that KSR had discredited Deuel to 
the extent that Deuel had implied that the obviousness inquiry could not take 
account of evidence that an invention was obvious to try. Kubin, 561 F.3d at 
1358. 
32 See infra II.B. 
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demonstrates that by refining the obviousness inquiry, courts can 
reduce the need to rely on the written description requirement. 
Given the well-documented awkwardness of the written 
description requirement, that is a very good thing. 
 
II. OBVIOUSNESS DOCTRINE AFTER KSR 
 
KSR is a watershed case on obviousness doctrine—but how, 
exactly? The point is perhaps more debatable than the watershed 
tag might suggest. KSR has certainly altered the PTO and 
practitioner ethos around the obviousness doctrine, reinforcing the 
proposition that obviousness is indeed the ultimate condition of 
patentability. KSR has also led to some discrete doctrinal changes, 
as Kubin illustrates. But it is not clear that KSR has wrought 
sweeping changes in the letter of obviousness doctrine—nor is it 
clear that KSR ought to be construed in such a way. The Federal 
Circuit has done a creditable job of moderating some of the 
immediate post-KSR hysteria, and in knitting together pre-KSR 
obviousness principles with KSR’s rhetoric. Judge Rader’s 
contributions to this effort have been important.  
 
A.  The Continued Vitality of the (Flexible) TSM Test: Translogic 
 
In the immediate aftermath of KSR, it was difficult to predict 
what would become of the teaching/suggestion/motivation (TSM) 
test. The Supreme Court had acknowledged that the TSM test 
“captured a helpful insight,”33
Thus, it was important that, a few months after KSR, Judge 
Rader handed down a decision that helped put to rest the rumors of 
the TSM test’s de facto demise. In In re Translogic,
 but criticized applications of it that 
were allegedly rigid. It was conceivable that courts would conclude 
that virtually all efforts to use the TSM test were impermissibly 
rigid. 
34 Judge Rader 
characterized KSR as having “reiterated the basic principles for an 
obviousness inquiry”35
                                                                                                         
33 KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. 
—a useful moderating signal—and as 
34 In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
35 Id. at 1259. 
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having “corrected a rather straightforward error.”36
[A]s the Supreme Court suggests, a flexible 
approach to the TSM test prevents hindsight and 
focuses on evidence before the time of invention 
without unduly constraining the breadth of 
knowledge available to one of ordinary skill in the 
art during the obviousness analysis.
 The error was 
the court’s failure to recognize that a prior art reference contributes 
to the public domain what not only it discloses, but also obvious 
variants of what it discloses, compounded by the further error of 
failing to observe that those obvious variants might extend beyond 
the specific problem that the prior art reference apparently 
addresses. The error was not, therefore, the use of the TSM test, 
which remained viable, at least in its more flexible incarnation: 
37
These comments, and others like them, lend an important 
moderating tone to the post-KSR obviousness jurisprudence. Some 
obviousness arguments surely are the product of hindsight, and 
concerns about hindsight should remain part of the obviousness 
calculus, even if they should not become all-purpose excuses for 
undermining obviousness as a policy tool. In keeping with the 
theme of maintaining balance in obviousness law, it did not hurt 
that Judge Rader’s pronouncements in Translogic were made in 
the course of a decision to uphold the Board’s obviousness 
determination.
 
38
Translogic and other post-KSR decisions appear to have put the 
Federal Circuit firmly back into the practice of invoking the TSM 
test, albeit flexibly. Indeed, Judge Rader reiterated his defense of 
the flexible motivation test a year later, in Ortho-McNeil 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.: 
 
The TSM test, flexibly applied, merely assures that 
the obviousness test proceeds on the basis of 
                                                                                                         
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 1260 (citation omitted). One might expect that Judge Rader would 
cite KSR in support of this proposition about what the Supreme Court was 
supposed to have suggested in KSR. Instead, perhaps tellingly, Judge Rader cited 
a pre-KSR Federal Circuit case, In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
38 Translogic, 504 F.3d at 1262. 
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evidence—teachings, suggestions (a tellingly broad 
term), or motivations (an equally broad term)—that 
arise before the time of invention as the statute 
requires.39
Finally, in Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.,
 
40 
Judge Rader demonstrated that the command in KSR for flexibility 
would not preclude the Federal Circuit from applying 
particularized rules to assess motivation in select cases. In 
chemical compound cases, Judge Rader ruled that “post-KSR, a 
prima facie case of obviousness for a chemical compound still, in 
general, begins with the reasoned identification of a lead 
compound,”41 where “lead compound” in this context had been 
defined in prior cases as “a compound in the prior art that would be 
most promising to modify in order to improve upon” the properties 
relevant in the case.42
First, KSR assumes a starting reference point or 
points in the art, prior to the time of invention, from 
which a skilled artisan might identify a problem and 
pursue potential solutions. Second, KSR 
presupposes that the record up to the time of 
invention would give some reasons, available 
within the knowledge of one of skill in the art, to 
make particular modifications to achieve the 
claimed compound. Third, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in KSR presumes that the record before the 
time of invention would supply some reasons for 
 The lead compound rule was consistent with 
KSR’s “assumptions about the prior art landscape”: 
                                                                                                         
39 Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). While Judge Rader attributed these insights to the Supreme 
Court, he cited his own remarks in Translogic as support. 
40 533 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
41 Id. at 1359. 
42 Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Takeda was a Judge Lourie opinion, but Judge Rader had 
invoked the “lead compound” concept in earlier cases. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming 
a ruling of no obviousness); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, 
Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same). 
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narrowing the prior art universe to a “finite number 
of identified, predictable solutions.”43
The lead compound rule restates basic concepts to tailor them 
for use in chemical obviousness, and finds some support in KSR, as 
Judge Rader’s Eisai opinion illustrates. By the same token, it also 
treads close to the forbidden territory of “rigid” motivation rules,
  
44 
and this concern would be heightened if the rule becomes the 
foundation for a formalized hierarchy of corollaries, or if the rule is 
invoked reflexively and woodenly to negate obviousness proofs 
irrespective of the factual context. On balance, the lead compound 
rule is constructive, and has continued to play a prominent role in 
post-KSR chemical obviousness cases.45
 
 
                                                                                                         
43 Eisai, 533 F.3d at 1359 (citations omitted). 
44 Judge Lourie has defended the lead compound analysis against arguments 
that it contravenes KSR. Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 2011-
1126, 2011-1127, 2012 WL 1571414 at *7 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2012) (approving 
of the district court’s analysis); Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Matrix Labs., Ltd., 619 
F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“While the lead compound analysis must, in 
keeping with KSR, not rigidly focus on the selection of a single, best lead 
compound, the analysis still requires the challenger to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have had a reason 
to select a proposed lead compound or compounds over other compounds in the 
prior art.”) (citation omitted). Judge Lourie elaborated that “proving a reason to 
select a compound as a lead compound depends on more than just structural 
similarity, but also knowledge in the art of the functional properties and 
limitations of the prior art compounds.” Id. 
45 Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 999, 1007 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (Ward, J., sitting by designation); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva 
Pharms. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Huff, J., sitting by 
designation) (“An obviousness argument based on structural similarity between 
claimed and prior art compounds ‘clearly depends on a preliminary finding that 
one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected [the prior art compound] as a 
lead compound.’”) (quoting Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1359) (citation omitted). But 
see Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“[T]he term ‘reference composition’ is more appropriate than ‘lead 
compound’ when considering obviousness for a chemical composition that the 
infringer deliberately imitates,” as in a case in which the patented formulation 
was intended to mimic a formulation previously approved by the FDA). 
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B.  The Proper Role of the “Obvious to Try” Inquiry 
 
For some years prior to KSR, courts analyzing obviousness in 
chemical composition cases invoked the “obvious to try” rhetoric. 
In the pre-KSR cases, “obvious to try” signified an error—namely, 
the error of finding obviousness where the evidence merely 
established that it would have been obvious to try a combination of 
alternatives. In KSR, the Court inverted the concept, invoking it as 
if it were a synonym for obviousness. This left the Federal Circuit 
with an important (albeit aggravating) question: was the new 
obvious-to-try label an unwitting slip of the pen, or had the Court 
intended to signal a significant change in the analysis of 
obviousness of composition inventions (especially selection 
inventions) in the chemical and biotechnology areas?  
Judge Rader carved out a position soon after KSR. Dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc in Pfizer, he insisted that 
“‘obvious to try’ jurisprudence has a very limited application in 
cases [involving ‘unpredictable pharmaceutical inventions’].”46 In 
a similar vein, in Ortho-McNeil, Judge Rader asserted that “KSR 
posits a situation with a finite, and in the context of the art, small 
or easily traversed, number of options that would convince an 
ordinarily skilled artisan of obviousness.”47 He proceeded to 
remark that the obviousness analysis was in error when it “retraced 
the path of the inventor with hindsight, discounted the number and 
complexity of the alternatives, and concluded that the invention of 
[the compound at issue] was obvious.”48
Kubin, introduced above, is undoubtedly the most important 
contribution to the refinement of the post-KSR obvious-to-try 
 This was a reiteration of 
the traditional understanding of the obvious-to-try concept, 
although Judge Rader did not explicitly invoke it.  
                                                                                                         
46 Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. 488 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Rader considered it wiser 
to employ a “reasonable expectation of success” analysis. Id.; see also Amgen 
Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Schall, 
J.) (“An obviousness determination requires that a skilled artisan would have 
perceived a reasonable expectation of success in making the invention in light of 
the prior art.”). 
47 Ortho-McNeil Pharm., 520 F.3d at 1364. 
48 Id. 
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jurisprudence. Invoking the Federal Circuit’s In re O’Farrell 
case,49
what would have been “obvious to try” would have 
been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous 
possible choices until one possibly arrived at a 
successful result, where the prior art gave either no 
indication of which parameters were critical or no 
direction as to which of many possible choices is 
likely to be successful. In such circumstances, 
where a defendant merely throws metaphorical darts 
at a board filled with combinatorial prior art 
possibilities, courts should not succumb to hindsight 
claims of obviousness.
 Judge Rader provided an important reminder of the pre-
KSR understanding of the obvious-to-try label: the real task at issue 
is to determine when an invention that might seem obvious to try is 
erroneously deemed to have been obvious. As Judge Rader noted, 
the Federal Circuit had identified two types of such errors long 
before KSR. In the first type: 
50
Quite delicately, Judge Rader connected this proposition to the 
language of KSR: “The inverse of this proposition is succinctly 
encapsulated by the Supreme Court’s statement in KSR that where 
a skilled artisan merely pursues ‘known options’ from a ‘finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions,’ obviousness under 
§103 arises.”
  
51
what was “obvious to try” was to explore a new 
technology or general approach that seemed to be a 
promising field of experimentation, where the prior 
art gave only general guidance as to the particular 
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it. 
Again, KSR affirmed the logical inverse of this 
statement by stating that § 103 bars patentability 
unless “the improvement is more than the 
 This is perhaps better than stating that the Supreme 
Court simply had its rhetoric backwards. As for the second type, 
                                                                                                         
49 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
50 Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359 (citation omitted). 
51 Id. 
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predictable use of prior art elements according to 
their established functions.”52
Judge Rader’s Kubin opinion provides a framework for 
connecting the pre- and post-KSR obvious-to-try jurisprudence. It 
confirms that obvious-to-try arguments have a place in 
obviousness analysis, but confines them appropriately. 
 
 
III. THE APPELLATE ROLE IN OBVIOUSNESS DETERMINATIONS  
 
KSR’s most profound long-term effect may be on process. KSR 
provided an important reminder that the Federal Circuit should not 
superintend obviousness casually, or through rote application of 
mechanical rules. But KSR also signaled that notwithstanding the 
case-specific, factually rich nature of obviousness analysis, 
obviousness was still amenable to summary judgment.53 It falls 
primarily on the Federal Circuit, exercising its de novo review 
authority, to sort through complex disputes to determine when 
summary judgments striking down claims for obviousness should 
be upheld. The Media Technologies Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck 
Co.54
Media Technologies will probably never make anyone’s list of 
classic patent law cases, but its lessons are in fact illustrative of the 
 case demonstrates how difficult this exercise is likely to be. 
                                                                                                         
52 Id. at 1359-60 (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 417). 
53 The Court asserted that: 
[t]o the extent the [Federal Circuit] understood the Graham 
approach to exclude the possibility of summary judgment 
when an expert provides a conclusory affidavit addressing the 
question of obviousness, it misunderstood the role expert 
testimony plays in the analysis. In considering summary 
judgment on that question the district court can and should 
take into account expert testimony, which may resolve or keep 
open certain questions of fact. That is not the end of the issue, 
however. The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal 
determination. Where, as here, the content of the prior art, the 
scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the 
art are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the 
claim is apparent in light of these factors, summary judgment 
is appropriate. 
KSR, 550 U.S. at 426-27 (citation omitted). 
54 596 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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difficulties that have arisen in scores of obviousness cases ranging 
across many decades. Media Technologies involved a patent that 
claimed a memorabilia card—a card depicting a famous 
personality, accompanied by a piece of a memorabilia item 
associated with that personality.55
In a 2-1 decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed. The majority 
opinion cast the obviousness case in straightforward terms: trading 
cards were known, sometimes including attached items (although 
not memorabilia, and not on sports cards); memorabilia was 
known; and the combination was prima facie obvious. The panel 
majority was unmoved by the patentee’s secondary considerations 
evidence. The patentee’s product had been commercially 
successful, but the patentee had not established any nexus between 
the commercial success and the merits of the claimed invention. 
Even if a nexus were presumed, the commercial success showing 
was insufficient to overcome the “strong showing of 
obviousness.”
 The district court had 
invalidated the claims on summary judgment based on 
obviousness. 
56
Dissenting, Judge Rader painted a starkly different picture of 
the evidence. In Judge Rader’s rendering, the prima facie case of 
obviousness was dubious. The defendant’s argument was based on 
four prior art references that a person of ordinary skill in the art 
might not even consider, much less combine, according to Judge 
Rader.
 Moreover, the physical limitations of the trading 
cards suggested that this was an endeavor in which the available 
range of solutions was finite, making it easier to justify 
obviousness on an obvious-to-try rationale. 
57
                                                                                                         
55 Some claims required that the card be a sports card, and other claims 
were directed to the fragment of memorabilia. 
 It was merely the defendant’s expert declaration that knit 
the references together, and that declaration was conclusory, in 
Judge Rader’s view. Moreover, per Judge Rader, the majority had 
elevated the defendant’s expert affidavits while ignoring the 
plaintiff’s.  
56 Id. at 1339. 
57 Id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting). Perhaps this hints at an argument that 
the references are not even analogous art, although Judge Rader did not 
explicitly advance that theory. 
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Indeed, the story of the invention, as Judge Rader told it, was 
rather remarkable: when the inventor first presented the idea of 
cutting up memorabilia and attaching it to trading cards, the 
trading card companies apparently expressed horror at the prospect 
of destroying memorabilia, then quickly came around once the 
inventor’s product proved to be a commercial success. As Judge 
Rader read the record, the accolades for the invention were 
substantial—“the newly-released cards became a staple of the 
industry”58—and the idea embodied in the patent was the “focal 
point”59 of promotional campaigns for the product, which would 
presumably be relevant to the nexus requirement. In addition, to 
Judge Rader, the prima facie case based on the prior art references 
was not so straightforward. None of the prior art references were 
“remotely related to the sport trading card industry,” according to 
Judge Rader.60
Judge Rader’s dissent demonstrates two points of significance 
beyond the immediate concerns of the case. First, it provides a 
good reminder that obviousness analysis frequently does call for 
nuanced assessments of the facts. Notwithstanding the KSR 
Court’s invitation to lower courts to grant summary judgment on 
obviousness, summary judgment is likely to be an appropriate 
vehicle in only a modest number of cases. To the extent that 
exuberant interpretations of KSR in the lower courts produce 
numerous summary judgment grants on obviousness, the Federal 
Circuit should exercise a moderating influence, preserving the role 
of the fact-finder. 
 The references depicted entertainers or (in one 
case) religious figures, and the items attached to the cards were not 
represented to be authentic memorabilia items. 
Second, Judge Rader’s dissent appropriately invokes classic 
themes of the dangers of hindsight bias and subjectivity in 
obviousness analysis, dangers that are especially salient when the 
subject matter at issue is regarded as “non-technical.”61
                                                                                                         
58 Id. at 1341 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 The 
majority had gone astray because it viewed the invention as 
humble and concluded a priori that the invention should therefore 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Media Techs., 596 F.3d at 1340 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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be deemed obvious. Judge Rader stated:  
Lurking just beneath the surface of this court’s 
blindness to the underlying facts supporting non-
obviousness is a bias against non-technical arts. No 
doubt, the invention of the transistor or of the polio 
vaccine came from more scientific fields and 
contributed more to the welfare of humanity. This 
court, however, cannot overlook that many 
individuals invest vast energies, efforts, and 
earnings to advance these nontechnical fields of 
human endeavor. Those investments deserve the 
same protection as any other advances. The 
incentives for improvement and the protection of 
invention apply as well to the creator of a new hair-
extension design as to a researcher pursuing a cure 
for cancer. In either case, the PTO and this court are 
charged with assessing the invention disclosure to 
determine its worthiness to receive a valuable, but 
temporally limited, exclusive right. Because this 
court dismisses this case so readily, I respectfully 
dissent.62
This is classic obviousness language, worthy of Judge Giles 
Rich, whose opinions on obviousness—and not a few other 
matters—surely set the gold standard. 
 
The KSR opinion closes with an eloquent disquisition on the 
connection between a robust obviousness standard and the ultimate 
instrumental goals of the patent system.63
                                                                                                         
62 Id. at 1342 (Rader, J., dissenting). But cf. Rothman v. Target, 556 F.3d 
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (upholding jury verdict of obviousness). In Rothman, 
Judge Rader steered clear of relying on the simplicity of the technology, but he 
did characterize the invention as one that “falls into a very predictable field,” 
and observed that “[i]n the predictable arts, a trial record may more readily show 
a motivation to combine known elements to yield a predictable result, thus 
rendering a claimed invention obvious.” Id. at 1319 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. 398 
(2007)). 
 So, too, Judge Rader’s 
63 As the Court put it: 
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and palpable 
reality around us new works based on instinct, simple logic, 
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Media Technologies dissent closes with a potent reminder that 
there is a fine line between applying obviousness robustly and 
transmuting it into a subjective judicial veto of patent rights.64
                                                                                                         
ordinary inferences, extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even 
genius. These advances, once part of our shared knowledge, 
define a new threshold from which innovation starts once 
more. And as progress beginning from higher levels of 
achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of 
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights 
under the patent laws. Were it otherwise patents might stifle, 
rather than promote, the progress of useful arts. These 
premises led to the bar on patents claiming obvious subject 
matter established in [Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 
(1851)] and codified in § 103. Application of the bar must not 
be confined within a test or formulation too constrained to 
serve its purpose. 
 The 
two passages together neatly encapsulate the push and pull of over 
a century and a half of obviousness jurisprudence. As that 
jurisprudence moves beyond KSR, it will continue to fall chiefly to 
Judge Rader and his colleagues to ensure that the obviousness 
doctrine remains muscular without becoming tyrannical. 
KSR, 550 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted). 
64 This is so whether or not one agrees with Judge Rader’s views on the 
disposition of the obviousness issue in the case. 
